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trying to produce a simplified picture has its pitfalls. Certainly, 
taking a 3 2-year 'window of observation' for analysis produces a 
paradox. Patterns may be more discernible over a long-term but 
the amount of data available often makes analysis complex. 
Furthermore, there are dangers of being trapped by the 
statistical procedures one adopts. Identifying four rather 
different domains in which those convicted of sex offences seem 
to operate, we have provided a somewhat essentialist stance. In 
brief, our analysis may suggest that lives are rather more static 
than they really are. In fact, lives can be quite dynamic. Perhaps 
persons whom we have deemed as essentially violent or 
acquisitive or deceptive or homosexual do change over time and 
what we have deemed as their 'master status' may not remain 
constant. Nevertheless, we suggest that this analysis helps to 
guard against the rather narrow focus on sexual offending in 
isolation which current theory and practice seem to 
encourage. @
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Model contracts in the
construction industry
by Geoff Haley
The International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) 
has produced a number of model form contracts for use in the 
international construction industry, included in the latest 
FIDIC Form of Contract, Fourth Edition, published in 1997. This 
article examines the approach taken by FIDIC on certain key 
contractual issues and contrasts it with that taken by the UK 
under the Private Finance Initiative.
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched in 1992 
with the aims of improving the quality and quantity of public 
sector capital projects and of developing higher quality and more 
cost-effective public services through partnerships with the 
private sector. The scheme is based on the premise of 
procurement of a high capital value asset being passed to the 
private sector together with the attendant risks. UK Government 
Departments must initially examine the PFI potential of all 
capital projects and if practicable, follow the PFI route. This has 
led to PFI being extended to a number of sectors in the UK 
including schools, hospitals, roads, police stations and 
government accommodation.
Under the PFI, the concept of Design Build Finance Operate 
(DBFO) was introduced as an alternative procurement method 
for the public sector. This involves a public sector body 
purchasing a capital-intensive service from a private sector 
provider, which includes provision and maintenance, under a
long-term contract. The public sector pays for the service in 
specific payments as defined in the contract which will depend 
on the provider's performance and/or usage of the service. The 
provider will assume responsibility for investing in the capital 
assets, financing that investment and managing the facilities to 
the level of service specified by the public sector.
FORCE MAJEURE
Force majeure is a concept widely understood and accepted 
throughout the world, although the definition and interpretation 
of the circumstances differ from one jurisdiction to another as 
do the legal consequences. It is generally accepted as being the 
circumstance under which the party suffering from a non-default 
incident, unforeseen and outside the control of the parties 
(i.e. usually the private sector partner) can be excused from 
further performance of the contract.
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The FIDIC model
Under ¥lDlC,force majeure is defined as
'an event beyond the control oj the Employer and the Contractor, 
which makes it impossible or illegal Jor a party to perform, including but 
not limited to:
(a) act of God;
(b) war, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), invasion, act of 
foreign enemies, mobilisation, requisition;
(c) rebellion, revolution, insurrection, or military or usurped power, or 
civil war;
(d) contamination by radio-activity from any nuclear fuel, orfrom any 
nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel, radio-active 
toxic explosive nuclear component of such assembly;
(e) riot, commotion or disorder, unless solely restricted to employees of 
the Contractor or ojhis subcontractors.' (FIDIC, Conditions of 
Contract for Design Build and Turnkey, First Edition, 1995)
If any of the above events occur, neither party shall be 
considered in default or in contractual breach to the extent that 
their performance of the contract is hampered by the event in 
question.
When aforce majeure event occurs, contractors must endeavour 
to continue to perform their obligations under the contract but 
only so far as is reasonably practicable. If, as a result of the 'force 
majeure', a contractor suffers loss or damage while trying to 
comply with the contract, then, to that extent, the contractor 
will be indemnified for the extra cost incurred. If the 'force 
majeure' delays the contractor's performance of the contract, 
then the contractor can be given extra time to perform.
Irrespective of any extension of time, if the effect of a force 
majeure event persists for more than 182 days, either the 
employer or the contractor may give notice of termination of the 
contract. It is suggested, however, that the 182-dav time frame be
oo ' ' J
amended where appropriate. This would probably be required by 
most contractors, who would find 182 days far too long.
If the contract is terminated the employer shall value the work 
done in the following way:
'(a) the amount payable for any work carried out for which a price is 
stated in the contract;
(b) the cost of plant and materials ordered for the works which have 
been delivered to the Contractor, or of which the Contractor is 
liable to accept delivery: such plant and materials shall become the 
property of (and be at the risk of) the Employer when paid for by 
the Employer, and the Contractor shall place the same at the 
Employer's disposal;
(c) any other cost or liability which in the circumstances was 
reasonably incurred by the Contractor in the expectation of 
completing the works (i.e. third party liability);
^d) the reasonable cost of removal of temporary works and
Contractor's equipment from site and the return of such items to 
the Contractor's works in his country (or to any other destination 
at no greater cost); and
(e) the reasonable cost of repatriation of the Contractor's staff and
labour employed wholly in connection with the works at the date of 
such termination.' (FIDIC, Conditions of Contract for Design 
Build and Turnkey, First Edition, 1995)
UK approach to force majeure and project finance
In the UK the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (the 
'Act') will apply unless the contract incorporates a provision 
dealing with the possible events of force majeure and their effect 
upon the performance and termination of the contract. The 
contract will be deemed 'frustrated', i.e. incapable of 
performance. However, there will be no contractual provision 
stating how long an event has to persist before the contract can 
be deemed frustrated.
A widely-drafted force majeure clause, similar to the FIDIC 
model, eradicates to a large extent the uncertainty of the Act and 
also gives the respective parties control over the circumstances 
surrounding such an event.
The FIDIC model clause applies to a project during the 
construction period. Under the UK PFI, the clause would apply 
to the design, construction and provision of service period, 
which could be 25 to 40 years.
As a public/private partnership, and in view of the length of 
the potential service period, it is important that the parties to a 
PFI contract know as clearly as possible what will happen at any 
given point in the contract period (being both the construction 
period and the provision of service period). Building an effective 
working relationship over the span of the contract is also 
imperative, which is aided at the outset by a recognition of the 
private sector's need for certainty in this respect.
As the UK PFI projects involve the introduction of equity and, 
in the main, bank debt, it is equally important for equity 
investors and bankers to be able to quantify the extent and 
circumstances of loss. This is much easier if an express 
contractual term sets out all the likelyforce majeure events.
The aim of aforce majeure clause should therefore be to address 
risks that cannot be economically insured and to specify how 
those risks should best be managed.
HM Treasury's position Under the 'Basic Contractual Terms' 
published by the Private Finance Panel Executive and HM 
Treasury (21 October 1996),force majeure events are limited to:
  war, civil war, armed conflict or terrorist attack arising within 
and affecting the United Kingdom; or
  nuclear, chemical or biological contamination of the 
contractor's property arising from any of the events at (a) 
above.
(In this definition, 'the contractor' is used to define the Special 
Purpose Vehicle Company (SPY) created to design, construct and 
operate a facility, e.g. a prison, hospital or toll road.)
The Treasury's definition of force majeure is extremely narrow. 
The Treasury envisages that other circumstances that have 
previously come underforce majeure will be dealt with separately 
under specific provisions within the contract.
An example of how this approach may be implemented can be 
seen in the way in which the issue of extension to the concession 
period was dealt with in the two completed PFI prison projects. 
The contracts provided that if the opening of the facility was 
delayed by events such as strikes by third parties, civil 
commotion or exceptionally adverse weather conditions, then 
the concession period would be extended, rather than the event 
in question giving rise to both parties being fully released from 
their obligations under the contract.
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The/orce majeure events should at this juncture be limited as far as 
possible to those defined by the Treasury as standard PFI practice. 
The consequences of jorce majeure should also be considered:
(1) Length of time before contract is terminated. A relatively 
short 'cure period* should be granted   perhaps six months, 
which is a reasonable mid-position and has been acceptable 
to bankers on other projects.
(2) Possible payment to private sector on the occurrence of a 
jorce manure event.
(3) Suspension of performance regime in respect onTy of 
services that cannot be made due to the occurrence of an 
event of jorce majeure.
(4) Suspension of availability payment to the extent the event 
has rendered the premises unavailable.
(5) The party suffering the jorce majeure event (usually the SPY) 
to use best endeavours to remedy the situation.
where the potential for default by either party is notorious. 
However, this is also an area of law where there are substantial 
differences between jurisdictions and where approaches thus 
vary considerably.
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The Treasury approach to Jorcc maycure 
appears to work perfectly well for the eventualities described. 
However, for other events often included under thejorce manure 
head, but excluded by the Treasury definition, this approach 
may not work. Examples of such events are natural disasters 
(e.g. earthquake, volcanic eruption, etc.) and damage caused by 
articles falling from aircraft or the impact of satellites. Events 
such as these have the potential to be equally as devastating as the 
events included in the Treasury's definition of jorce majeure. If the 
latter definition ofjorce manure is to be used then the contract 
must recognise some other forms of cataclysmic events beyond 
the control of both parties and provide for a method of releasing 
the parties from their contractual obligations, or for events of a 
less cataclysmic nature, a method for adjusting the parties' 
obligations in a just and equitable manner.
One possible method of achieving this would be to classify 
such risks as 'uninsurable risks'. Such a title is a slight misnomer 
as, in fact, some of these risks may actually be insurable, albeit at 
a disproportionate cost. The consequences of an event of 
'uninsurable risk' could be fixed by the contract to be less final 
and absolute as the consequences of an event of jorce majeure. For 
example, it could be provided that the obligations of the parties 
are suspended for the period while the risk operates, subject to 
negotiation between the parties as to how any resulting 
additional costs will be shared.
The contractual consequences of an 'uninsurable risk' event 
occurring may vary, depending on whether it occurs during the 
construction or operating phase of the project. For example, 
long delays during the construction phase could be compensated 
for by an adjustment to the availability payment over the 
remaining term of the agreement and/or an extension to the 
concession period. In the case of such events occurring during 
operation, another possible solution would be to suspend any 
monitoring and performance requirements.
If any bidder is forced to shoulder a high level of risk by a very 
narrow definition of jorce majeure, this will be reflected in the 
overall pricing of the bid. Extra insurance costs and/or 
contingency sums will have to be built into the pricing structure.
CONTRACT TERMINATION
Contract termination is a fundamental issue that must be 
examined in any contract, especially in construction contracts
under
Under the FIDIC rbrm o^ Confracf there are three possible 
termination scenarios: *
» no default
* contractor's default
» employer's default
No <fe/bu7f This is generally accepted to be covered by the 
jorce mayeure clause that was examined above and by a change of 
law clause.
Under the FIDIC model, if a contractor 
fails to carry out any of his obligations, or if the contractor is not 
executing the works in accordance with the contract, then the 
employer may give notice to the contractor, requiring him to 
remedy his failure within a specified reasonable period. If the 
contractor:
( 1 ) fails to comply with the above notice;
(2) abandons or repudiates the contract;
(3) without reasonable excuse fails:
(a) to commence the work in accordance with the 
contract;
(b) to proceed with the works in accordance with the 
contract; or
(c) to demonstrate that sufficient design capacity is 
employed in the design of the works to achieve 
completion within the time for completion;
(4) becomes bankrupt or insolvent or goes into liquidation, 
etc.; or
(5) assigns the contract or subcontracts the works without the 
required consent;
then the employer may, after having given 14 day's notice to the 
contractor, terminate the contractor's employment under the 
contract and expel him from the site. The contractor shall not be 
released from any of his obligations or liabilities under the 
contract. The rights and authorities conferred on the employer,
o I ^
and the employer's representative, by the contract shall not be 
affected.
Under this clause, the employer can terminate the 
contractor's employment if any of the above occur. However the 
contractor is not in any way released from his contractual 
obligations or liabilities. It should also be noted that, under this
O
clause, the employer has the option of removing the contractor 
from the site. This could, potentially, be very controversial since 
the contractor might want to challenge the termination and 
stay on site until a decision is reached on the matter. This is 
generally motivated by the fact that such challenges can be very 
time-consuming if they go to court or arbitration.
Under the FIDIC rules, termination payments are to be 
determined by the engineer after any termination by the 
employer. His duties include a valuation of the work carried out
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under the contract, unused and partially used materials, any 
equipment and any temporary works. The FIDIC model also 
provides that the employer is not liable to pay anything to the 
contractor until:
'[the] expiration ofd^cK 7ia6i/ity period and fnereajter unti/, cc»K 
of execution, comp/etion and remedying of any dejects, dama^ejjor de/ay 
in completion, i^ any, and* a/7 otner expenses incurred 6}' tne emp/oj'er 
nave 6een ascertained and tne amount tnereof certi^ed 6}- tne engineer. ' 
(FIDIC form of Contract, Fourth Edition, 1997)
Fmpfoygr'j <fe^au/f Under the FIDIC form of Contract, the 
employer is in default if he:
» fails to pay the contractor the amount due under any 
certificate of the employer's representative within 42 days 
after expiry of the time stated in the contract within which 
payment is to be made (except for any deduction that the 
employer is entitled to make under the contract);
* becomes bankrupt or insolvent or goes into liquidation, etc.;
» consistently fails to meet the employer's obligations under the
contract; 
» assigns the contract without the contractor's consent; or
if a prolonged suspension affecting the whole of the works goes 
beyond that authorised in the contract, then the contractor may 
terminate his employment under the contract by giving notice to 
the employer. (Sub-clause (2) would be omitted if the employer 
was a government.)
The terms of employer's default are very similar to those used 
for contractor default. The terms of payment on termination 
have one significant difference, however: in addition to those 
mentioned above the employer is also required to pay to the 
contractor 'the amount of any loss or damage to the contractor 
arising out of, or in connection with, or by consequence of such 
termination' (FIDIC form oj Contract, Fourth Edition, 1997.
This means that the contractor should be able to claim both 
his consequential losses and his future loss of profits.
However, the public sector will wish to limit the above by: 
limiting compensation to the SPV in the event of SPV default 
and in the event ofjorce mayeure; and 
deducting losses suffered by the public sector. 
The followin are 6
in UK PFJ contracts
In the event of contract termination, the contract must 
provide a mechanism to ensure that the SPV is compensated for 
the value of the project assets, plus other liabilities and expenses. 
In general, the SPV will suffer more loss on termination than the
o
public sector, as the facility which it designs and builds, using its 
own and bank finance, will revert to the public sector on 
termination. The private sector's view is usually that where the 
termination is caused by circumstances w ithin the control of the 
employer or government, the compensation payable should also 
include reimbursement of the equity investment in the SPV 
(sometimes including liabilities incurred towards third parties 
and the costs of demobilisation) .
The SPV is likely to request compensation for:
# * its cost in developing and constructing the project (where
termination occurs during construction); 
* outstanding borrowings, including interest and commission,o o ' o *
and third party liabilities (where termination occurs during 
the operational phase);
» financing costs, interest and finance charges (e.g. breakage 
costs);
« a return on equity
rtpqymenf Until the PFI market matures, debt 
pro\iders will always push to be kept whole on termination. In 
the future this will no doubt change, but debt returns are at 
present not seen to be sufficiently high for such a significant risk 
to be taken on bv the banks.
Reimbursement o^ equity investment The private sector view
is usually that where termination is not caused by SPV default, 
the compensation payable should also include reimbursement of 
the equity investment in the SPV (sometimes including liabilities 
incurred towards third parties, or breakage costs, and the costs 
of demobilisation). This is often calculated on the basis of the 
deemed fair market value of the equity share capital in the SPV, 
taking into account the value of the contract 6ejore termination.
However, the public sector would wish to exclude return on 
equity and limit demobilisation/third party costs in the event of 
SPV default and ^orce ma/cure.
Deducting A»je$ In compensating the SPV for equity and/or 
loan repayments, the public sector will wish to ensure it is in 
turn compensated for its losses. However, the public sector 
should avoid deducting its losses from debt repayments, as the 
key aim in termination provisions is to facilitate repayment of 
principal debt, in order to improve the project's 'bankability'. 
Accordingly, any compensation provisions should not impinge 
on debt repayment.
force mo/eure The SPV may argue that risk of Jorce mayeure 
events (for which commercially viable insurance is not available) 
cannot rest with the SPV, because banks will not lend to them 
unless thev are confident that their debt will be discharged in full
^ O
if the contract fails due to Jorce mayeure. Accordingly, debt 
repayments must be made. However, beyond that, mutual 
liabilities should be minimised. This means that the SPV should 
take on the risk of losing equity, and any further compensation 
provisions should be limited to direct losses only.
Employer de/au/t Where the employer is in default and the 
SPV decides to terminate the contract, compensation would be 
paid for the following:
« outstanding loan principal, together with interest and finance 
charges (e.g. breakage costs);
» fair market value of equity investment in the SPV on the basis 
of a going concern;
» other liabilities to third parties incurred by the SPV and 
committed as at termination date, including accrued 
dividends and interest on subordinated debt (if any);
* costs of demobilisation (including redundancy costs if TUPE 
does not apply);
* fees and expenses of any receivers appointed.
However the employer might require the option to nominate 
a third party to acquire the equity or to pay the equivalent sum 
to the SPV If the former route was chosen then the employer 
would also pay to the SPV a sum sufficient to discharge 
outstanding debt, interest and finance charges. If the latterC* ' O
option was taken the employer would have the option to 'step in'
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and continue debt repayments, interest and financing charges, 
according to an agreed timetable.
The value of equity must be the fair market value, immediately 
prior to date of termination, as between a willing vendor and a 
willing purchaser, taking into account the net present value of 
the contract tor the remainder of the contract period. The 
calculation must also take into account all rights, liabilities and 
obligations of the SPY immediately prior to the termination 
date.
SPY default The employer will be entitled to terminate the 
project agreement in the following circumstances:
  SPY insolvency;
  poor performance by the SPY (as defined by reference to 
persistent service failure or prolonged unavailability tests);
  other material breach of the project agreement by the SPY
Compensation payable to the SPY should be calculated by 
using a valuation formula. The formula should not give rise to
o o
any obligation on the SPY to make a payment to the employer. 
The principle behind this is that the senior debt provider should 
always be made whole.
CONTRACT VARIATION
It is widely agreed and acknowledged that, due to the size, 
complexity and length of major construction contracts and, 
similarly, concession agreements, no agreement could ever cover 
or foresee all the possible changes that could affect a project. 
Because of this, it is generally accepted that it is necessary to 
incorporate a mechanism for the implementation of changes that 
are found to be necessary or desirable during both the 
construction and service provision phases.
The FIDIC model
Under the FIDIC Form of Contract, it is stated that:
'The Engineer shall make any variation of the form, quality or 
quantity of the works or any part thereof that may, in his opinion, be 
necessary andjbr that purpose, or if Jor any other reason it shall, in his 
opinion, be appropriate, he shall have the authority to instruct the 
Contractor to do and the Contractor shall do any of the following:
(1) increase or decrease the quantity of any work included in the 
contract;
(2) omit any such work (but not if the omitted work is to be carried 
out by the Employer or by another Contractor);
(3) change the character or quality or kind of any such work;
(4) change the levels, lines, position and dimensions of any part oj the 
work;
(5) execute additional work of any kind necessaryJor the completion of 
the works; or
(6) change any specified sequence or timing of construction of any part 
of the works.
No such variation shall in any way vitiate or invalidate the contract, 
but the effect, if any, ofall such variations shall be valued in accordance 
with the contract. Provided that where the issue of an instruction to vary 
the works is necessitated by some default of or breach of contract by the 
Contractor or Jor which he is responsible, any additional cost 
attributable to such default shall be borne by the Contractor.'
Under this clause the engineer's powers, as agent for the 
employer in this case, are very wide since he can order a 
variation or acquiesce a variation proposed by the contractor. 
The scope of the variations is also very wide since it covers form, 
quality- and quantity of the works.
Under sub-clause 5, any 'additional work' is limited to 'any 
kind necessary for the completion of the work'. Thus, additional 
work for a purpose unconnected with the original concept, of 
unnecessary, could not be imposed and would have to be agreed 
by all the parties. However, what is 'necessary' or not is a matter 
to be decided by the engineer. In addition, the clause also gives 
the engineer discretion to order a variation if 'in his opinion' it 
is 'appropriate'. The fact that the necessity and appropriateness 
of the works are dependent on the engineer clearly demonstrates 
the huge discretion awarded to him and just how limited the 
contractor's powers are in this field.
One reason for this discretion is that the engineer is 
considered to be the most suitable person to take the decisions. 
This is because he is an expert in the field who is involved in the 
project and, most importantly, because he is perceived as 
impartial since he is between the employer and the contractor. 
However this neutrality has often been challenged by both 
parties, depending on who employs and pays the engineer.
Differences under UK PFI
UK variation clauses in PFI projects are somewhat different 
from those proposed by FIDIC. The discretion and the powers 
of the employer and the engineer are far more restrictive. This is 
illustrated by the following, which is a typical Build Own 
Operate Transfer (BOOT) project clause:
'The Authority shall be permitted to vary the Design Documents and/or 
the Works and in such circumstances the following procedure shall 
apply:
(1) the Authority shall submit details of the Proposed Variation to the 
SPY who shall provide an estimate of the value oj the Proposed 
Variation and an estimate of the length of any extension of time 
and the amount oj any loss and or expense to which the SPV 
might become entitled in respect of the Proposed Variation within 
[ ] Business Days of the Authority's original notification of the 
Proposed Variation;
(2) if the estimate prepared by the SPV under Subclause (1) is
accepted by the Authority, the Authority will issue an instruction to 
the SPV confirming the Variation and the Authority will then grant 
an extension of time and/or give affect to the agreed valuation as 
detailed in the estimate.'
Here the agreed amount of loss and expense can be paid as a 
lump sum or added to the revenue stream as an increase in the 
payments due to the SPV during the 'operation and 
maintenance' phase.
'(3) in the event that Agreement cannot be reached as to the estimate 
referred to in Subclause (I), and the Authority wishes to proceed 
with the Proposed Variation, then the matter shall be determined 
by the Disputes Resolution Procedure;
(4) for the avoidance of doubt, any change in Legal Requirements
during Phase 1 apart from those specified in Schedule 9 (for which 
the SPV shall not be compensated) shall be treated as a Confirmed 
Variation Order for all the purposes of this Clause.'
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This clause allows the authority' to amend the design and 
indeed the elements of the works in accordance with the 
prescribed procedure. The procedure suggested places an 
obligation on the SPY to provide an estimate of the cost and any 
extension of time required for completion of the works directly 
arising from the proposed change. The authority can review the 
capital required and its effect on the programme when deciding 
whether or not to proceed with the change. If, however, the 
authority wishes to proceed with the change, but disagrees with 
the estimate provided by the SPY, both parties have recourse to 
the disputes resolution procedure which can determine the costs 
of the change in question. This is in contrast to the FIDIC 
approach to variation where the engineer is given final authority' 
in the matter.
Sub-clause (4) covers the situation where there are changes 
made to the law after the agreement has been entered into with 
the effect of requiring a change in the design or contents of the 
works. In this situation the change would be regarded as a works 
change in accordance with sub-clauses (1) (3) and the SPY 
would be entitled to claim compensation for any increase in cost 
under that procedure. However, an important exception to this 
relates to certain prescribed changes in law which have been 
anticipated by the parties. These would normally be listed in a 
separate schedule and the SPY would not be entitled to any 
compensation for any additional costs or extension of the period 
of works arising from such changes. The SPY is deemed to have 
included the impact of such changes in its pricing structure.
CHANGE IN LAW: FIDIC v UK PFI
Both systems make provision for the impact of changes in law 
occurring after the commencement of a contract period.
The FIDIC model
Under the FIDIC model, there are four clauses which cater 
for any change of law or change in economic policy of the 
country where the project is being constructed. These clauses 
regulate the relationship between the parties under such 
circumstances. There are also supplementary clauses which 
provide for specific requirements of individual projects, 
depending on their status, nature and size.
The model implies an obligation on the contractor to comply 
with all statutes and regulations, including payments imposed 
under certain legal rules (FIDIC, Form of Contract, clause 26). 
There are two exceptions to these payments, which are the 
responsibility' of the employer: first, any compensation payable 
for occupation of land by the works and, secondly, the obtaining 
of planning permission, zoning or other similar permission 
which is necessary in order for works to proceed.
The model also provides for fluctuations in the costs of labour 
and materials or any other matters which affect the cost of 
construction as a result of changes in legislation in the country 
where the project is to be constructed (clause 70.2).This must 
occur after the date 28 days prior to the latest date for 
submission of tenders for the contract. Fluctuations are easily 
calculated by the engineer, who determines any additional or 
reduced cost after 'due consultation' with the employer and the 
contractor, and the determined figure will be added to or 
deducted from the contract price.
The UK PFI approach
Changes in law which could have an impact on the project 
include increases in taxation; changes in health and safety 
regulations which require an alteration to buildings; changes to 
a specific law or regulation regarding the relevant sector 
(e.g. student accommodation, in the case of a university) or 
specific PFI project discriminatory legislation (e.g. windfall tax 
on PFI concessionaires). The impact of a change in law will vary 
not only with the type of change, but also with the phase of the 
project affected by it.
For example, during the construction phase the effect is likely 
to be limited to the cost to the SPY of making changes to the 
design, specification or quality, etc., of the building. A change in 
VAT amounts or minimum wage legislation, however, may affect 
the payments which the SPY has to make to its sub-contractors 
(in either phase).
During the operational period, a change in law could have a 
number of consequences, including increasing operating costs or 
reducing usage. In either scenario this might prejudice the SPV's 
ability to cover its running costs and debt service.
The SPY should be prepared to accept a significant proportion 
of the risk of a change in law. They should have considered the 
risk in preparing their bid. Usual business risks, such as a change 
in corporation tax, should not be passed back to the public- 
sector. The public sector should consider offering a 
compensation payment to the SPY should the change incur costs 
exceeding an agreed figure. Furthermore, any increase in costs 
over a prescribed ceiling figure would permit either party to 
terminate the agreement.
Procedure in the event of a change in law is summarised 
below:
  where a change in law is likely to cause an increase in 
construction, operation and maintenance costs, the SPY must 
supply full written details of the anticipated effects of the 
change on their costs;
  agreement must then be reached between the parties on the 
percentage increase in costs the change will cause;
  if agreement is not reached, the percentage increase will be 
determined by the disputes resolution procedure;
  no compensation will be given to the SPY where the increase 
in costs falls below a prescribed limit;
  compensation will be given where the costs exceed the lower 
limit but do not exceed a prescribed upper limit;
  compensation will be calculated in accordance with a formula 
set out in a Schedule to the Concession Agreement;
  should the increase in costs exceed the prescribed upper limit,
either party may terminate the agreement.
Unless the agreement is terminated, the SPY \\ill be expected 
to carry out all its obligations under the terms of the Concession 
Agreement irrespective of whether or not agreement has been 
reached on the percentage increase figure or if a compensation 
payment is to be made.
CONCLUSION
There are significant differences between the approach taken 
by FIDIC and that taken by the UK in PFI contracts. This is 
mainly due to a change in the bargaining strength of the parties. 13
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Under the FIDIC model, the employer is either the public- 
sector or a private entity, whereas in PFI projects in the UK only 
the public sector is using this route to build/finance 
infrastructure projects. The crucial factor, however, is that UK 
PFI deals are dependent on private funding; this means that the 
public sector's bargaining hand is weakened since private sector 
financiers will invariably want maximum protection for their 
investments. The structure of the deals is also very different 
since most PFI contracts are service-orientated. This means that
the construction part of the agreement is not the most 
important feature of the contract and therefore the negotiating 
position of the parties differs accordingly. @
Geoff Haley
Partner, Arnold S^Porter
The selection of arbitrators: 
another view
by K V S K Nathan
In the January 1999 issue of Amicus Curiae, David Winter OBE of Baker & McKenzie 
in his article 'The selection of arbitrators' set out the process of choosing an 
arbitrator, which he divided into 12 points in his summary. Here, Dr K V S K Nathan 
responds to Mr Winter's article and expresses his own views on the topic.
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I read with interest the paper by David Winter OBE on 'The selection of arbitrators' in Issue 1 3 of Amicus Curiae (January 1999). I agree entirely with the author except for the fact 
that, under the conditions that exist in the real world, the 
selection of arbitrators is made by people with an imperfect 
knowledge of the individual arbitrators and the nature of the 
dispute. In my opinion, the focus should be on the process of 
selection rather than on the individual arbitrator. The selection 
process should be seen as fair and neutral and respect the 
autonomy of the parties in dispute. The product of this process 
would lead to an ideal arbitration, if not the ideal arbitrator.
By themselves, considerations of psychology of the individual 
arbitrator, bias and independence, leadership qualities and 
acceptability to all parties can mean different things to different 
people, or indeed mean little in a world of intrigue and interest 
groups and divisive politics. Appearances can be very deceptive. 
In the terms expressed in the article, the ideal arbitrator, or for 
that matter the ideal judge in a court of law, is an elusive creature 
of our imagination.
PARTY EXPECTATIONS
Since arbitration is the creation of the parties in dispute, one 
should look at the expectations of the parties themselves in the 
selection of an arbitrator or arbitrators. Obviously the ideal 
arbitrator would be one who would faithfully follow the wishes 
of the parties in regard to the expeditious conduct of the 
arbitration and making of the award This would be consistent 
with the goal of arbitration, namely a binding award in 
accordance with the laws and rules agreed between the parties in
dispute. However, there will be questions of fact as well as of law 
to be determined in an arbitration and, therefore, one has to 
accept that individual arbitrators, like individual judges in a court 
of law, can come quite honestly to different conclusions. There 
can be a whole range of value judgments to be made and 
arbitrators, like their counterparts in the courts of law, can vary 
widely in their perceptions of matters before them and of the 
credibility- of witnesses, but that does not signify bias one way or 
another or disqualify them from being arbitrators and judges. I do 
not think that we want arbitrators to be clones of one another.
From the perspective of a party in dispute, the ideal arbitrator 
would be someone who would hopefully support the party's case 
in the matter in dispute. Where the party has the right to 
nominate an arbitrator, it is bound to look for someone who will 
perceive and interpret the facts and law of the case in a manner 
favourable to the party concerned. The party would be 
interested not only in the arbitrator's background qualifications 
and experience but also his or her views as expressed in a variety 
of contexts, such as public statements, law journals, previous 
awards and so on. There is nothing wrong in a party selecting as 
arbitrator someone whom he or she thinks would be 
sympathetic to his or her case. That the arbitrator thinks one way 
or another is not always an indication of bias but rather an 
illustration of his or her powers of reasoning and intellect. 
Reading the criteria listed in the article, one might be tempted 
to think that it may be prudent for arbitrators to keep their views 
on issues of the day to themselves, because the devil one does not 
know would seem to be better that the devil one knows. That 
would be harmful to the whole adjudicatory process, where one 
is searching for the truth. Truth is most likely to be discovered
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